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Construction and engineering projects are typically complex in nature and are prone 
to cost and schedule overruns.  A significant factor that often contributes to these 
overruns is rework. Omissions errors, in particular, have been found to account for as 
much as 38% of the total rework costs experienced.  To date there has been limited 
research that has sought to determine the underlying factors that contribute to 
omission errors in construction and engineering projects.  Using data derived from 59 
in-depth interviews undertaken with various project participants, a generic systemic 
causal model of the key factors that contributed to omission errors is presented. The 
developed causal model can improve understanding of the archetypal nature and 
underlying dynamics of omission errors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Design changes, errors and omissions account for 79% of the total rework costs 
experienced in a project but of this percentage, omissions errors account for 38% 
(Willis and Willis, 1996). Omissions errors can be defined as failures to follow due 
procedure when undertaking a task(s). These are the single most common form of 
human error (Reason, 2002). Specifically, projects appear to progress smoothly until 
nearing completion, when such errors made earlier are discovered, necessitating costly 
rework. Such rework transpires as overtime, additional hiring of resources (including 
labour and plant), schedule slippage, and reductions in project scope or quality.  The 
adverse consequences of these difficulties include reduced profit, loss of market share 
and reputation, increased turnover of management and workforce, lower productivity, 
higher costs, and, all too frequently, costly litigation between participants over 
responsibility for overruns and delays. 
There has been a considerable amount of research that has examined the nature of 
human errors, its types and causes in a range of areas such as aviation (e.g. Amalberti 
and Wioland, 1997), medicine (e.g. Reason, 1995), engineering design (e.g. Busby, 
2001) and construction (e.g. Atkinson, 1998), yet studies that explore the underlying 
conditions and factors that contribute to the occurrence of omission errors are limited. 
Using data derived from 59 in-depth interviews undertaken with various participants 
operating in the construction and resource engineering sector a generic causal model 
of omission errors is developed. 
CAUSES OF ERROR 
Errors occur due to physiological and psychological limitations of humans 
(Helmreich, 2000).  It is a matter of contention whether individuals can justifiably be 
blamed for all errors, as making mistakes is an innate characteristic of human nature 
(Reason, 1990).  Human errors occur for various reasons and therefore different 
actions are needed to prevent or avoid the different sorts of error experienced in 
construction and resource engineering projects. Regardless of the skill level, 
experience or training that individuals possess, errors and omissions may be made at 
any time. 
Reason (1995) proffered that there is no one error taxonomy that can be used for all 
circumstances as different error classifications serve different needs. Despite Reason’s 
(1995) assertion, several classification schemes however have been put forward for 
identifying generic causes of error (e.g. Andi and Minato, 2004) and are deemed 
useful for assessing potential risks in projects. For example, Rogge et al. (2001) 
developed a tool to provide early warning of possible rework prior to construction, 
based on the underlying conditions that could contribute to its occurrence. Such 
conditions include the degree of design coordination that is undertaken, the extent of 
design schedule compression, and the regularity of engineering verifications. 
Similarly, Manavazhi (2004) developed a probabilistic model that could be used to 
forecast the propensity of a project to encounter design revisions. Design revisions are 
an inevitable and integral feature of the design process therefore, it is important that 
firms are able to put mechanisms in place to plan and manage them as they occur. 
Design revisions that require rework arise due to errors, incomplete misinformation, 
and changes (e.g. those that are client initiated and unforeseen) and can have 
detrimental effect on productivity, morale, designer attitudes and the overall 
profitability of the design practice.  An error can arise due a number of reasons: 
 Mistake - an error occurs as a result of ignorance of the correct task or the 
correct way to perform it.  Reason (1995) suggests that such mistakes can be 
either rule- or knowledge based. With respect to rule-based errors, a 
practitioner may simply misapply a rule that is has worked in a previous 
situation because they failed to notice contraindications. Alternatively, a bad 
rule that has remained uncorrected in a practitioner’s collection of problem 
solutions could be applied to the situation at hand. Knowledge based mistakes 
occur when the practitioner encounters a novel situation that lies outside the 
range of their learnt problem solving routines. Kletz (1985) refers to such 
mistakes as a mismatch, as they arise because they are beyond the physical or 
mental capability of an individual. When confronted with such a position, 
practitioners are often forced to resort to slow and effortful reasoning and as 
such susceptible to making errors (Reason, 1995). This is because a 
practitioner can only attend to and manipulate one or two discrete items at a 
given time, and they have to reply on a mental model of the current situation 
that is inherently incomplete (Reason, 1995).  In addition, practitioners have a 
tendency to follow their instinct and select features of the world to support it, 
while neglecting contradictory evidence that presents itself before them.  
 Non-compliance – an error occurs because an individual decides not to carry 
out a task or not to carry it out the way instructed or expected.  They are 
deliberate acts and may occur due to motivational problems (e.g. low morale, 
poor supervision, perceived lack of concern, etc). Such errors occur in a 
regulated social context and the prevention of which must be addressed 
through motivational and organisational remedies vis-à-vis improving the 
quality and delivery of information within an organisation and project. 
 Slips and lapses of attention – an error that occurs as a result of forgetfulness, 
habit, or similar psychological issues. Here the error typically occurs at the 
level of execution and generally involves routine tasks in familiar 
surroundings. Reason (1995) suggests such errors are associated with some 
form of attention capture, either distraction from the immediate surroundings 
or a preoccupation with something. 
Omission errors arise when the mental process of action-control is subjected strain or 
distraction (Reason, 2002). Action control involves at least four stages, planning, 
intention storage, execution, and monitoring, and a problem in anyone of these 
processes may lead to an omission occurring (Table 1). 
Table 1. Processes involved in omitting a necessary step (Reason, 2002) 
Level of Failure Nature of Failure Failure Type 
Planning and intention 
formation 
• A necessary item is unwittingly overlooked 
• The item is deliberately left out of the action plan 
Mistake 
Violation 
Intention storage in 
prospective memory 
• The intention to carry out the action(s) is not 
recalled at the appropriate time 
Lapse 
Action execution • The actions do not proceed as intended and a 
necessary item is unwittingly omitted from the 
sequence 
Slip 





Determining the exact cognitive processes that are involved in omitting a crucial task 
is an arduous process, as even the error maker finds it difficult to identify the cause of 
a specific failure. Reason (2002) suggests that to reduce the incidence of omission 
errors in a process, there needs to be a shift away from examining the underlying 
mental processes involved to those characteristics most likely to afford them. Several 
authors have identified a number of task properties that are likely to increase the 
probability that a particular task in a process will be omitted, for example: 
 The greater the informational loading of a particular task, that is, items within 
a step are more likely to be omitted when the demands imposed upon short 
term memory are higher (Norman, 1998); 
 Procedural steps that are functionally isolated, that is, ones that are not 
obviously cued by preceding actions nor follow in a direct linear succession 
from are more likely to be left out (Reason, 2002); 
 Recursive or repeated procedural steps are particularly prone to omission. In 
the case where two similar steps are required to achieve a particular goal, it is 
the second of these two steps that is most likely to be neglected (Herrman et 
al., 1992); 
 Steps in which the item to be acted is concealed is liable to omission (Reason, 
2002);  
 Steps located near the end of a task sequence are likely to be omitted. Such 
premature exits are due in part to the actors preoccupation with the next task, 
particularly when the current activity involves largely routine tasks (Reason, 
1998); and 
 Tasks that involve planned departures from standard operating procedures or 
from habitual action sequences are liable to strong intrusions in which the 
currently intended actions are supplanted by a more frequently used routine in 
that context, and thus omitted (Reason, 2002). 
A number of the above omissions may occur simultaneously and be combined into a 
single task. When this happens, the effects are additive and the result is a recurrent 
error trap for those involved (Reason, 1998). 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
To determine the latent conditions that contribute to omission errors an exploratory 
research approach was adopted. This was because limited research pertaining to the 
causal ascription of omission errors has been undertaken within the domain of 
construction and resource engineering projects. Causal modelling, an inherent feature 
of system dynamics, was used to construct a systemic causal model of omission 
errors. Causal modelling can be used to provide managers with the necessary insights 
about the inter-dependencies and behaviour between key variables that can contribute 
to omissions so that learning and process improvements can be made to future 
projects. 
Data collection 
Fifty nine in-depth interviews were conducted over a six month period with a variety 
of personnel such as operations managers, project managers, engineering managers, 
architects from the construction and resource engineering sector (Table 2). Interviews 
were used as the mechanism to determine the causal nature of omission errors. 
Interviews were chosen as the primary data collection mechanism because they are an 
effective tool for learning about matters that cannot be observed. According to Taylor 
and Bogdan (1984:p.79), no other method “can provide the detailed understanding 
that comes from directly observing people and listening to what they have to say at the 
scene”.  Construction and resource engineering firms from Melbourne, Perth, and 
Sydney were selectively sampled and invited to participate in the research so as to 
reduce the likelihood of duplicating experiences from the same project. Firms in the 
Top 20 for construction and resource engineering by turnover as per the Dun and 
Bradsheet listing were identified and those where the research team had a direct 
contact point were invited to participate in the research. The interviews were 
conducted at the offices of interviewees. Interviews were tape recorded and 
transcribed verbatim to allow for the nuances in the interview to be apparent in the 
text. The interviewees’ details were coded to allow for anonymity, although all 
interviewees were aware that it might be possible to identify them from the content of 
the text. The format of the interviews was kept as consistent as possible following the 
themes associated with rework identified from the literature. Interviews were kept 
open using phrases such as ‘tell me about it’ or ‘can you give me an example’. The 
open nature of the questions allowed for avenues of interest to be pursued as they 
arose without introducing bias in the response. Notes were taken during the interview 
to support the tapes to maintain validity. Each of the interviews varied in length from 
45 minutes to two hours. Interviews were open to stimulate conversation and 
breakdown any barriers that may have existed between the interviewer and 
interviewee. 
Data analysis 
The text derived from the interviews was analysed using QSR N5 (which is a version 
of NUD*IST and combines the efficient management of Non-numerical Unstructured 
Data with powerful processes of Indexing and Theorising) and enabled the 
development of themes to be identified. One advantage of such software is that it 
enables additional data sources and journal notes to be incorporated into the analysis. 
The development and re-assessment of themes as analysis progresses accords with the 
calls for avoiding confining data to pre-determined sets of categories (Silverman, 
2001).  Kvale (1996) suggests that ad hoc methods for generating meaning enable the 
researcher access to ‘a variety of common-sense approaches to interview text using an 
interplay of techniques such as noting patterns, seeing plausibility, making 
comparisons etc’ (p.204).  Using NUD*IST enabled the researchers to develop an 
organic approach to coding as it enabled triggers or categories of interest in the text to 
be coded and used to keep track of emerging and developing ideas (Kvale, 1996). 
These codings can be modified, integrated or migrated as the analysis progresses and 
the generation of reports, using Boolean search, facilitates the recognition of conflicts 
and contradictions. This process enabled the development of a causal model. Reason’s 
(2002) classification of ‘failure types’ (i.e. mistake, violation, lapse, slip) was used to 
determine the reason for the occurrence of an omission error (Table 1). The interviews 
revealed insights about participants and their experiences associated with omission 
errors in projects. Table 2 presents a summary of interviewees sampled by industry 
sector. From the interviews a total of 85 omission error cases were derived from the 
interviewees’ comments.  
Error categorisation 
Table 3 presents examples of omission errors and the respective failure type. It can be 
seen that 53 (62%) of errors were due to practice, 11 (13%) task, 5 (6%) circumstance, 
11 (13%) convention and 5 (6%) tool. An example of a violation was undertaking a 
peer-review of design documentation for internal purposes so as to reduce risk and not 
to examine how the mechanical engineering design married with the project’s 
structural elements (Table 4). This practice not only results in the review process 
being ineffective but is likely to lead designers into a false sense of security and 
perhaps aberrant to self checking. An array of practices contributes to the occurrence 
of an omission error. The practice of designing work based on tentative information, 
departing from established procedures and under estimating the time for engineering 
design are common conditions with which design firms are typically confronted with. 
The effects of adopting such practices can lead to higher demands being placed 
project personnel (e.g. stress and anxiety), conflict and naturally, increased project 
time and cost. In terms of tasks, the causes of omissions related to designers and 
project personnel being placed under increasing pressure to complete their tasks 
within a specified time frame. Unrealistic demands and constraints were deemed to 
have been imposed on project personnel, which often resulted in tasks being 
‘unwittingly’ overlooked or omitted from a pre-determined sequence. For example, in 
Table 4, project personnel were confused about whose role it was to order materials. 
This situation arose because the engineering manager had not confirmed with the 
procurement personnel the required specification for some off-shore equipment that 
was required. Without the confirmation no order could be placed. Yet, the 
procurement personnel simply forgot to follow-up with the engineering manager and 
without checking assumed that an order had been placed. 
Table 2. Sample characteristics by position and industry sector 








Operations Manager 2 2 - 
Project Manager 12 4 5 
Structural Engineer 3 3 4 
Procurement Manager - 2 - 
Quantity Surveyor 1 - 4 
Architect - - 8 
Mechanical Engineer 2 5 - 
Engineering Manager - 2 - 
 
Many of the underlying conditions that contribute to an omission are interdependent 
and in many instances isolating a specific causal variable proved difficult (Table 4). 
The issue of design fees was identified by interviewees in the construction sector as a 
factor contributing to an omission and design related rework. Lower design fees 
juxtaposed with a ‘stretched’ design and documentation schedule invariably resulted 
in tasks such design reviews, checks, and verification being omitted. Moreover, to 
maximise fees and save design time existing design details and specification are 
reused, which may result in having a design that is inappropriate for its intended 
purpose. 
Table 3 identifies an example of an omission error and how it was classified in terms 
of failure type. Of the 85 omission cases identified, violations accounted for 51 (60%) 
slips 14 (16%), lapses 13 (15%) and mistakes 7 (8%). Many of the violations 
identified were simply committed with the intention of increasing operational 
efficiency. Firms cannot and should not tolerate disregard for established procedures. 
The consequences of following such a course of action could be disastrous, not only in 
terms of increased project costs and time but areas of safety and design integrity. 
There are several compelling reasons for this.  One is, of course, that standardisation 
of operations cannot be achieved with idiosyncratic adherence to procedures. 












• Failure to undertake design 
reviews 





19 17 17 
• Engineer failed to detect and 
corrects an omission in design 
documentation 
• Schedule pressure resulted in 





2 5 4 
• Low design fees meant tasks were 
deliberately left out  
• Schedule pressure result in some 





2 1 2 
• Re-use of existing specification 
and design solutions 





4 2 5 
• Inoperability with CAD software 
applications (no checking for 
inconsistencies) 
• Simplification of tasks and neglect 




1 1 3 
 
Causal model of omission errors 
A detailed analysis of the interview data enabled the researchers to determine the 
archetypal nature and underlying dynamics of errors and thus develop a systemic 
causal model (Figure 1). Figure 1 identifies the conditions that can promote an active 
failure to arise. Client requirements and the fees and margins of designers, consultants 
and contractors were issues that influenced the planning and resource allocation and 
the subsequent workload of individuals of individuals. More often than not in projects, 
individuals and teams are given excessive workloads that require them to work longer 
hours in order to meet schedule. Consequently, individuals are subjected to increased 
levels of workplace stress and subjected to information overload which can affect 
short term memory of individuals (Table 4). This can result in a task deviation 
occurring through a lapse or slip. Procedures such as checking are simply overlooked 
or not given the due attention that is required when pressure to ‘get the job done’ is 
exerted. Views from respondents revealed that it is often taken for granted that if there 
are ‘omissions’ and they cannot be readily detected then they will be picked up later in 
the project. The longer an error goes undetected the likelihood of significant rework 
occurring increases which can impact cost and schedule. 
Table 4. Examples of omission errors 





• Task sequence omitted 
 
• Procedural steps that 
are functionally isolated 
 
“For detailed design you have to pay lump sum for certain parts of the 
design. There is always a lot of pressure on the consultants to be 
competitive either through minimum target man-hours, or through the man-
hour rates. Consultants tend to recover that by increasing scope through 
claiming for changes in the design. They often “take short cuts” when they 
feel they are not getting a good fee. If they work on a lump sum basis there 
is always a lot of pressure on total number of man hours required to do the 
work and if they need more man hours, then as they have to deliver within 
the lump sum so their way to save money is by reducing what they pay 
their people. It is only under fully reimbursable type of contract where you 
can take that kind of pressure away.  You need some idea how much a 





“Well…a number of reasons….If you look at where we are today we are 
almost 70% of the way through the project, running almost 10% behind. 
The reason for the delay [is] late placement of purchase orders for some 
materials, late delivery of some materials; somebody forgot to place an 
order or assumed someone else going to do it. Engineering is progressing 
on track and if you look at the work off-shore, we’re also behind work off-
shore. The reason we are behind work off-shore is due to errors and the 
subsequent rework”. 
 
• Task sequence omitted 
“But in practice you don’t have time to do that, it’s just not possible, as you 
try to meet the schedule, and so you end up taking some short cuts …..You 
compromise if you like” 
 
• Task sequence omitted 
 
• Procedural steps that 
are functionally isolated 
“We carry peer reviews etc at various stages during design and also during 
construction. However, when schedule (perhaps due to a major re-design) 
becomes critical we sometimes skip these stages and try to manage the 
subsequent risks that could arise. When we do peer reviews we bring 
someone in who is external to the project that has the right level of 
experience to sit down and review the proposal and making sure that based 
on their experience it all appears to be logical and sensible as to where we 
are going. In my experience though there have been times when the peer-






• Task sequence omitted 
“You get errors because there is a misunderstanding (or lack of knowledge) 
by the fabricator of the design.  Not that the design is wrong but the way 
the fabricator reads the design information might be different from the way 
the designer meant it to be. In this case, we were under pressure to finish a 
number tasks, and certain things were ‘basic’ items had been missed off the 
drawings and we expected the fabricator to pick this up – he didn’t. It was 
our fault really 
 
An engineering manager suggested that a parochial attitude of ‘she’ll be right’ was 
prevalent in many projects and thus contributed to the establishment of complacency. 
This was also identified as occurring in several instances by project managers on-site 
in construction and resource projects. Another interviewee stated that some engineers 
on-site often do not adhere to company quality procedures/standards and fail to 
complete the required documentation. Only when non-compliance is issued or an audit 
is undertaken that they begin to do what they are supposed to do. Then after a period, 
the engineers on-site tend to go back to their original modus operandi. It was 
suggested by the project manager that some form of penalty could be issued for 
continually adhering to non-complaint practices or some form of educational 



















































Figure 1. Systemic causal model of omission errors 
When projects are subjected to fast-tracking (overlapping of design and construction 
activities) it was found that the re-use of design details and specifications by 
architects, and engineers were approaches used to minimise their workload and the 
production of a tentative design. This can lead to incomplete information with regard 
to design. The effects of having tentative design information are compounded further 
when organisations use differing technology and software applications that are partly 
incompatible (interoperability). Simple, pragmatic considerations such as checking for 
design inconsistencies are overlooked due to an ‘unhealthy’ over-reliance on the 
software applications output.  Ambiguous communication such as not providing clear 
direction and information on what, when and how a task is to be completed can result 
in tasks being omitted. This was clearly the case in the example presented in Table 4, 
when there was a misunderstanding about the late placement of purchase orders. 
Interruptions to tasks being undertaken due to rework, design changes, or sequencing 
of tasks may result in an individual forgetting what they were supposed to do and skip 
particular steps because they have been delayed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Omission errors are a problematic issue in construction and resource engineering 
projects. The competitive environment within which firms operate often results in 
short cuts and procedural tasks being neglected in order to achieve the demands being 
imposed on them.  Organisations and individuals tend to repeat such practices because 
they become complacent as there appear to be no direct consequences for their 
actions. Even when errors do arise, there appears to be no transfer of learning from 
previous experiences. This is because organisations operating in a project environment 
are subject to new demands and constraints by different client organisations. The 
causal model that has been presented can be used to provide project managers with a 
better understanding the omission affording features inherent to projects and therefore 
aid them in identifying and implementing error containment and reduction strategies. 
The caveat to this is that no one strategy is a panacea for reducing omissions, but 
focusing on the reduction of violations and adhering to procedures and protocols is the 
first step that is required in this instance. 
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